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Innovation in traditional industries can be challenging, especially in the context of digitization. While implementing 
new approaches and technologies is always demanding, dealing with organizational and cultural change can be 
critical.  
Mibelle Group and its workforce of 1,200 employees develop proprietary and other brands in the fields of personal 
care & beauty and home care & nutrition, as well as active ingredients at Mibelle Biochemistry. Its headquarters are 
in Buchs, Switzerland, and it has sites in four countries: Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. 
This working paper tells the story of how Mibelle Group approached the development of an innovative digital busi-
ness model for SJÚ, a premium cosmetic brand to be sold online. In particular, it describes the organizational and 
cultural challenges Mibelle Group faced and what can be learned from their experiences. 
Building innovative future business is never a trivial matter. It requires preserving the current business while man-
aging the cultural change and organizational challenges that result from pursuing these two very different aspira-
tions.  
 
Mibelle Group’s goals (see Figure 1) towards these strategic directions are as follows (Mibelle Group, 2016):  
– Better & More: Mibelle Group wants to expand its core business, the development of private labels, and 
make it more (cost-) efficient. This business is characterized by short periods and a high frequency of 
product launches (several hundred per year) and smaller, incremental organizational and technical im-
provements. 
– New & Different: This strategic direction entails the development of new business models for radical in-
novations, such as SJÚ. This business is characterized by long periods and a low frequency of product 
launches (a few dozen per year) and focuses on groundbreaking organizational and technical advances. 
– Definiteness & Ambiguity: Bridging the gap between traditional and innovative business, the old and the 
new worlds, while exploiting potential synergies requires a common understanding of corporate culture, 
even more so if the new world is financed by revenues of the old world. Mutual learning and support are 
key factors.  
The combination of traditional and innovative business is difficult to achieve. There are profound differences in the 
types of problems and how they need to be solved: Traditional business addresses complex problems with stand-
ardized measures and experience, both of which benefit from repetition. Gebauer (2017) referred to this approach 
as “Logic I”. Innovative business, however, typically engages in “Logic II”, which is the term he used to describe 
complex and rather unpredictable situations where the outcome is highly uncertain. Logic II, therefore, focuses on 
currently perceived risks – learning about them and finding ways to mitigate them. 
Figure 1: The strategic directions of Mibelle Group (Mibelle Group, 2016) 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the differences between the two types of logic. 
 
 Logic I Logic II 
Perceived challenge Solving complicated but seemingly calculable  
problems 
Solving complex and unpredictable situations 
Description Technical / trivial system Social / non-trivial system 
Goal Preservation and protection of security Dealing with currently perceived risks 
Approach Security through technology / routine / repetition Managing risks by organizing collective awareness 
Focus Preserve / stabilize Learn / innovate 
Logic I and II also differ in the strategies used to counter uncertainty (Brückner & Böwer, 2015; see Figure 2). The 
maxim of Logic I is to “control the expected” in advance by relying on standardization and repeatability. The glass 
ceiling shown in Figure 2 reflects the limitations of this strategy, where “more of the same” will not necessarily 
produce better results or may even achieve the opposite. In Logic II, unpredictability is accepted and addressed 
with flexible responses. “Known unknowns” are expected, “unknown unknowns” are embraced as opportunities for 
learning. Such a practice of learning and experimentation is key to strategic renewal (Binns et al., 2015), especially 
in the medium term of building an emerging business (Erzinger et al., 2020). 
 
 
Table 1: Differences between Logic I and Logic II (Gebauer, 2017, p. 89) 
Figure 2: Two strategies of addressing uncertainty (Brückner & Böwer, 2015, p. 16) 
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2 SJÚ: Vision of a New Digital  
Business Model 
Mibelle Group is the third-largest European manufacturer of private label cosmetics. It produces proprietary brand 
products for many companies across Europe. However, as far as innovative business models are concerned, 
Mibelle Group lacks know-how and experience, especially regarding the development of innovative brands and 
services. This is a problem because innovation is becoming more and more important in the cosmetics sector, as 
this list of current trends shows:  
– There is a shift in the retail sector from offline to online business. 
– There is a change from mass-produced goods to highly personalized products, services, and packaging. 
– Online consultation can provide a personalized experience. 
– New types and designs of cosmetics application (e.g., masks, skin care devices) are emerging. 
– Sustainability (natural, organic ingredients and packaging) is gaining in importance. 
With these trends in mind, Mibelle Group created a vision for a new business model: SJÚ, a personalized premium 
cosmetics line to be marketed and sold exclusively online1. Positioned in the B2C market and presented online, 
SJÚ was an opportunity for strategic renewal outside the established core markets (Binns et al., 2015), comple-
menting the traditional business segment without competing with it. 
The following basic concept was developed in 2017: On the SJÚ website, the end-customer would fill out a detailed 
questionnaire about their skincare needs and upload a suitable photo of themselves. Cosmetic experts would then 
analyze the information provided and create an individual formulation for a set of personalized skincare products, 
which the customer could order directly (and repeatedly) in the online shop. To accommodate changing needs (e.g., 
drier skin in the winter), the product’s formulation could be changed, allowing the customer to order another, also 
personalized version of their skincare regime. 
As groundbreaking as this innovative business model was, it brought with it many product-related challenges that 
were new to Mibelle Group (see Figure 3). 
 
 
As Figure 3 shows, the members of the SJÚ project team had to consider many requirements. These included 
customer-centricity (having to research the prospective retail clients and identify their specific needs), the customer 
 
1 Former post on the brand’s Instagram account: “SJÚ - Your skin is beautifully unique, just like you. We make personalised skincare that adapts 
to the changing needs of your skin.” 
Figure 3: Product-related challenges of SJÚ 
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experience (Weill & Woerner, 2015), and online marketing (having to develop a new brand that could be marketed 
online). In addition, there were the complexities of online technology (having to develop a website and an online 
shop, an online questionnaire, and the technology needed for skin analysis based on the information provided).  
Although the project team succeeded in addressing all these areas, SJÚ did not meet Mibelle Group’s financial 
expectations. A minimum viable product was launched in the summer of 2018, and was discontinued in early 2020. 
Significantly, many of the challenges in developing the SJÚ product line were not technical in nature. Rather, they 
were related to organizational factors. In the following sections, these challenges are explored in detail. 
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3 SJÚ: Organizational Setup 
For the organization to be able to learn as much as possible from the process of developing SJÚ, it was set up as 
an internal corporate venture. To this end, internal experts were seconded from Mibelle Group’s traditional business 
sections to develop the product line on a part-time project basis. They would be instrumental in transferring the 
project outcomes back into the traditional business. Being an integral part of the project organization with its inno-
vative ideas and methods was meant to inspire and excite all business units (traditional and new).  
This approach has features of both the “intrapreneur” and the “educator” corporate venturing modes in accordance 
with Gutmann (2019) (see Table 2): Intrapreneurs generate ideas internally; they develop and commercialize them 
within or outside the traditional domain, using internal resources to generate and accelerate innovation and busi-
ness opportunities. Educators invest in internal business opportunities, but they also focus on creating a more 
entrepreneurial culture by driving the innovation, creativity, and calculated risk-taking of employees while also 
providing training and education. They build on their company’s resources to nurture and support new business 
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This approach is also reminiscent of the principle of medical vaccination: to enable it to learn and adapt to changes, 
the company is exposed to innovation in small doses while maintaining organizational functions and processes for 
the existing businesses. This allows the organization to gradually become better prepared for innovation and more 
resilient in managing change.  
Such an involvement is considered difficult to achieve by (external) startups or incubators, which operate more 
independently of the parent organization and have dedicated employees who only work for the innovation project 
team (as opposed to also being part of a traditional business unit). In addition, it often proves difficult to integrate 
innovation from incubators into the traditional organization because the required functions and processes do not 
yet exist, and neither does the culture. If incubators fail, this can also mean that the organization will benefit little 
from their experience and the knowledge gained. 
Being set up as an internal corporate venture, the SJÚ project team had to face the challenges of the different types 
of logic mentioned above. As an industrial company, Mibelle Group operates along the principles of Logic I (highly 
standardized planning, efficiency goals, low risks and error tolerance), while SJÚ – as an innovative endeavor – 
operated according to Logic II (openness of results, limited predictability, high risks, and error tolerance).  
The opposing types of logic had various effects on Mibelle Group and its employees. The traditional organization 
had to learn that innovation is highly unpredictable and very iterative and may not always comply with existing 
Table 2: Corporate venturing modes (Gutmann, 2019, p. 129) 
8    Lessons Learned from SJÚ 
 
expectations, processes, and guidelines. Conversely, the SJÚ project team also had to establish a deep under-
standing of the specific details of Logic I to benefit from the know-how of the traditional business. However, while 
applying new approaches and techniques as is usual for innovation projects, the team also had to “unlearn” specific 
traditional behaviors and bypass existing processes.  
In the next section, the most important organizational challenges and lessons learned are reviewed in detail. 
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4 SJÚ: Challenges and Lessons 
Learned 
4.1. FROM B2B TO (ONLINE) B2C 
For a company that had previously been mainly active in the traditional B2B field, the move into B2C and online 
sales was a big step. It would affect many of Mibelle Group’s activities, especially the interaction with its end-
customers, and would require market and trend research as well as needs and requirements analysis. In addition, 
online marketing would require more than building a website and setting up social media accounts.  
Initially, many of the corresponding functions and processes in the organization were either not available or were 
exclusively geared towards B2B. For example, the SAP IT system was not designed to process end-customers 
efficiently, let alone deal with individualized products. This made it difficult to process orders from the online shop. 
It was therefore necessary to build a dedicated system to handle the tasks related to personalization, sales, and 
shipping, among others.  
These technological hurdles, together with the expectation that SJÚ would – to a certain extent – adhere to existing 
processes and use the existing infrastructure, led to a certain amount of organizational friction. 
Lessons Learned 
The learning curve of changing from a mass market to personal online sales was very steep and was under-
estimated, at least in the beginning. Not enough attention was paid initially to understanding the end-customer 
and meeting their needs and desires. Such a human-centered design did not reflect the tradition and experi-
ence of the organization. 
The shift to online marketing and sales was found to be complex. In retrospect, it would have made sense to 
build and manage a corresponding online community as early as possible and use it for feedback and mar-
keting, thereby allowing for organic customer growth. 
Regarding the existing infrastructure and processes, a high degree of organizational flexibility was necessary 
to apply them in innovative settings or to replace them with new ones if necessary. 
 
4.2. INTEGRATION INTO THE EXISTING ORGANIZATION 
As described above, SJÚ was embedded within the company to allow cross-pollination between the different busi-
nesses. This was often perceived as problematic and was not always productive.  
In particular, the need to implement fast, pragmatic solutions typical of innovation projects clashed with the Logic I 
approach of the traditional business side. The people working there had been taught to be precise and follow internal 
and external regulations, processes, and product specifications to the letter. For the SJÚ project team, on the other 
hand, it was sometimes necessary to bypass established processes – always with the challenge of not interfering 
with other products relying on these processes (e.g., in terms of packaging, legal framework, quality, planning, or 
financials).  
This tension was reinforced by the inherently poor predictability of an innovation project with regard to issues such 
as quantities of ingredients and packaging volume, the scalability of production and IT systems, as well as the 
planning horizon and corresponding lead times. While such requirements are standard according to Logic I, in Logic 
II they can often only be communicated provisionally and with a high risk of being “incorrect”. 
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Another area of friction was a lack of skills in certain areas, such as procurement or packaging development since 
the existing organization had little experience with premium products. However, the respective departments resisted 
the idea of outsourcing certain tasks that they regarded as their area of expertise.  
The deployment of internal staff was also challenging for another reason, namely their availability. Most of the 
employees involved in SJÚ were doing so part-time: Their main work was in traditional business units (e.g., R&D, 
logistics, and marketing). The innovation project was, therefore, not their first priority. Their performance was meas-
ured primarily by the (financial) performance of the traditional business, so dealing with problems in their daily 
business always took precedence over SJÚ. This led to availability issues and transfer losses when employees 
were transferred or needed to be replaced. As a result, the transfer of the innovative spirit and know-how of the 
project into the traditional business, which is a key principle for strategic renewal (Binns et al., 2015) and had been 
an important goal, was never really achieved. 
Another challenge for Mibelle Group was their internal employees’ understanding of their specific professional roles. 
They had mostly been trained in Logic I, and it was, therefore, difficult to establish a “culture of error”. As a result, 
communication of operational problems often clashed with personal sensitivities. To work on the innovation project, 
the staff had to extend their traditional roles (and adapt their self-image) to cope with unfamiliar, unexpected prob-
lems on a daily basis. There are many reasons why not all employees are capable or willing to leave their comfort 
zone. However, working on a Logic II project can also broaden the mindset and strengthen the flexibility of employ-
ees, who may actually appreciate the experience as enriching and develop an emotional connection to the project 
(Binns et al., 2015). 
Lessons Learned 
In theory, closely embedding innovation projects into the organization seems a promising approach for a 
company. The iterative exchange between Logic I and Logic II business challenges existing processes and 
structures, resulting in improvements. The resulting friction seems necessary to enable sustainable changes 
(“vaccination”). 
One the other hand, this approach requires a compromise regarding the speed of iterative development which 
may be crucial for innovation projects (in particular with regard to windows of opportunity). From a practical 
point of view, certain existing premises should therefore be revised as follows: (1) the innovation project 
should be staffed with a dedicated team (whose first priority is the project); (2) it should be easier to bypass 
internal processes that do not work for Logic II projects – this does, of course, require the strong support of 
top management (see Challenge 4 below).  
Such an approach would combine the advantages of an internal corporate venture with those of an independ-
ent innovation lab: a dedicated team that makes use of internal infrastructure and processes but can circum-
vent them if necessary. This should also make it easier and faster to generate success stories that inspire the 
organization by linking the preservation focus of Logic I and innovation focus of Logic II. 
However, this cultural change is difficult to achieve “on the job”. In order to enable all members of an organi-
zation to learn, gain insights, and develop new views and skills, an innovation project should be accompanied 
by a dedicated transformation program. This should provide the organization with up-to-date information and 
knowledge in a structured way (e.g., through regular newsletters, presentations, or round-table discussions).  
 
4.3. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
As discussed above, the internal procurement of competencies required to deal with SJÚ proved difficult. Similar 
problems were encountered with external procurement from partners and service providers. For example, the mul-
tilateral management of (external) cooperation (briefings and debriefings or communicating and reviewing require-
ments and specifications) proved to be both demanding and time-consuming. The innovation project also covered 
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several areas that were new territory for Mibelle Group, especially the new target market (B2C) but also the tech-
nology and marketing requirements of selling the SJÚ product line online. It was therefore also challenging to assess 
the competence of potential service providers and what to consider in terms of the content they should deliver and 
the criteria for successful cooperation with them. 
As the SJÚ product line evolved, its requirements and objectives evolved along with it, which also affected the skills 
required from service providers. For that reason, the service providers for the IT platform, design and marketing, 
and online performance marketing had to be replaced in mid-project. This raises the question of how this could 
have been avoided, such as by correctly assessing the specific goals of the various development stages and match-
ing them with service provider profiles. 
Lessons Learned 
Skills and competencies that are unavailable internally may be obtained quickly and easily from external ser-
vice providers. At the same time, it is important to build up basic competencies in the relevant areas internally 
quickly to allow for  
(1) more and faster iterations that enable employees to gain confidence in the new technologies and ap-
proaches early. (Early steps in new areas are often taken rather slowly and with a tendency to “perfection”.)  
(2) better assessment of provider profiles to find the best match in terms of the project goals at certain stages 
of the project. When planning the project, it should be taken into account that, as the project develops and 
goes through the various stages of product development, service providers must adapt in terms of the services 
they provide. 
4.4. EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS 
A very important factor in innovation projects is how to measure success. As such projects mostly learn and develop 
through failure (i.e., when hypotheses are falsified), traditional key performance indicators may not reveal much 
about their progress or success. One such indicator may however be the speed with which an organization is able 
to recognize failure and turn it around. 
To be able to operate as an innovative startup within the organization, the project needs “space to fail”, which 
requires the trust and support of all stakeholders, especially top management (Viki, 2018). This, alas, was not 
always the case with SJÚ. Although the project’s iterative design and development were generally well received, 
the expectations Mibelle Group had with regard to SJÚ’s (financial) success were similar to those for its other 
products, and so they also used the same metrics (KPIs, planning horizon).   
Lessons Learned 
As with any strategically important venture, support from top management is crucial. This also requires clear 
expectation management and the definition of appropriate goals and metrics. It is not advisable to impose 
direct budgetary sanctions on innovation projects if their development is actually based on making mistakes 
and learning from them.  
At the beginning of an innovation project, it is difficult to estimate the expected revenue and measure the 
success of the project against it. Since the primary goal of the project may be to identify potential end-cus-
tomers and develop an appropriate product for them, such sales forecasts will change quickly and frequently 
as they are necessarily based on, mostly untested, hypotheses. If management compares such a product 
with traditional products, it will inevitably perform worse. This increases the risk of “false negative” decisions, 
meaning the discontinuation of products for the wrong reasons. 
Fear of sanctions due to (financial) “setbacks” may impede regular, transparent communication with manage-
ment. The result could be a vicious cycle: Communication may be kept to a need-to-know level, and updates 
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will be provided less frequently. Management may take less notice of the project and, ultimately, be less 
committed to the product.  
In summary, therefore, an innovation project needs a strong internal sponsor who understands the project’s 
approach and stands firmly behind it. In addition, the project requires a protected space to prototype and 
learn. 
Innovation projects require metrics to measure their success other than financial KPIs. These might include 
predefined project phases and goals that are aimed at progress in terms of content maturity, amount of testing 
performed, or number of different variants explored – with committed budgets (“financial space”, according to 






Although the SJÚ project was ultimately not viable economically, it has resulted in many helpful insights from which 
the organization can benefit. In particular, it had to face many challenges regarding the product itself (B2C, premium 
segment, online sale). However, the most important stumbling blocks were organizational and cultural in nature. 
The lessons learned are summarized below. 
Innovation projects should   
– be decoupled from daily (traditional) business as much as possible. To enable cross-pollination be-
tween Logic I and Logic II business, innovation projects should rely on the same organizational pro-
cesses and structure as traditional projects, but with justified exceptions. 
– have dedicated staff members focusing on and prioritizing the project at hand. This should allow for 
faster and better development and be better suited to provide success stories and inspiration for the 
organization as a whole.  
– be accompanied by dedicated transformation programs fostering the cultural change. 
– manage expectations differently than traditional projects, using appropriate goals and performance 
metrics that reflect uncertainties. This requires strong support from top management as well as a 
willingness by everyone to learn and adapt.  
– follow an iterative approach. It should not try to accomplish “everything at once” and test the product 
in the real market with real end-customers as early as possible.  
 
 
14    Lessons Learned from SJÚ 
 
References 
Binns, A., Harreld, J. B., O’Reilly III, C., & Tushman, M. L. (2015). The Art of Strategic Renewal. In MITSloan 
Management Review (Ed.), Top 10 Lessons on Strategy. 
Brückner, F., & Böwer, M. (2015). Das “MindSet Achtsames Organisieren.” Sozialmagazin, 5–6, 14–25. 
Erzinger, M., Bär, L. E., & Loher, S. (2020). Strategic Agility: The modern strategist’s playbook on staying relevant 
in a turbulent world. 
Gebauer, A. (2017). Kollektive Achtsamkeit organisieren: Strategien und Werkzeuge für eine proaktive Risikokultur. 
Schäffer Poeschel. 
Gutmann, T. (2019). Harmonizing corporate venturing modes: An integrative review and research agenda. Ma-
nagement Review Quarterly, 69(2), 121–157. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11301-018-0148-4 
Mibelle Group. (2016). Strategic Directions. Unpublished internal company document. 
Viki, T. (2018, May 16). Eight Ways To Create Space For Innovation. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ten-
dayiviki/2018/05/16/eight-ways-to-create-space-for-innovation/ 
Weill, P., & Woerner, S. L. (2015). Optimizing Your Digital Business Model. In MITSloan Management Review (Ed.), 




Sibylle Welker holds a master’s degree in applied mathematics as well as a degree in business mathematics. She 
has decades of experience in marketing and sales, product development and brand leadership in the cosmetics 
industry. From 2015 to 2019, she was Head of Business Unit Beauty DACH and International at Mibelle Group and 
thus responsible for the SJÚ innovation project. 
Bergit Sagebiel holds a master’s degree in economics and business administration and is trained in business coach-
ing and consulting as well as design thinking facilitation. She has many years of experience in innovation projects 
and creative methods. She was responsible for the design and operational implementation of SJÚ at Mibelle Group 
from 2017 to 2019.  
Philipp Matter is a senior lecturer at ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences and an expert in innovation pro-
jects at the interface between business and IT. He holds a doctorate in computer science and has worked as a 




School of  
Management and Law 
 
St.-Georgen-Platz 2 
P.O. Box 
8401 Winterthur 
Switzerland 
 
www.zhaw.ch/sml 
 
 
